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MELIORISM V. "BOMB-THROWING" AS
TECHNIQUES OF REFORM
Sanford Levinson*
It is always a pleasure to return to the University of Tulsa College of Law. I have
been here for several earlier iterations of the program for which Heather Gerken is this
year's honoree, including one in which my own work was the focus.I I was (and remain)
extremely grateful, and I am sure that is true for Heather. It is no small matter to have
one's body of work selected for acknowledgment and, just as importantly, serious dis-
cussion. But a second reason makes me feel some special bond with Tulsa and its law
review; three years ago, I wrote a screed for the University of Texas Law Review bewail-
ing the ever-diminishing interest, on the part of most student-edited law reviews, in pub-
lishing book reviews.2 It turns out, for example, that the modal number of book reviews
in the so-called top-twenty law reviews is zero. 3 The meaning of this weekend, of
course, is that scholarship is important, but it is obviously the case that much scholarship,
even increasingly within the world of the legal academy, takes the form of books instead
of, or in addition to, law review articles.
Almost immediately after publication of the Texas Law Review article, I received
an invitation from the editor-in-chief of the Tulsa Law Review to organize a full issue of
the Review that would be dedicated to book reviews.4 I gladly accepted the invitation,
contingent on my friend Mark Graber's joining me in being the impresario for what both
of us thought was a potentially important contribution to the world of legal scholarship
- that is, the evaluation of books on issues important to the law. 5 Two of those sympo-
sium issues have now come out,6 and the Review is currently receiving, I hope, the last
submissions for this year's issue, which I assume will come out sometime during this ac-
ademic year.7 Few law schools, therefore, can match Tulsa in taking legal scholarship, in
* W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas Law
School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin. The text sets out some of the reasons for my
gratitude to the Tulsa Law Review for having been invited to participate in this occasion. I do want to
acknowledge the meticulous organization and hospitality of everyone on the Law Review, especially Rachael
Hughes. I have chosen to modify only slightly the remarks delivered in September 2012, even though we obvi-
ously now know the results of the November election.
1. Symposium, The Scholarship ofSanford Levinson, 38 TULSA L. REv. 553 (2003).
2. Sanford Levinson, The Vanishing Book Review in Student-Edited Law Reviews and Potential Respons-
es, 87 TEX. L. REv. 1205 (2009).
3. Id. at 1208-09.
4. Mark A. Graber & Sanford Levinson, Selection Biases, 45 TULSA L. REv. 575, 575 (2010).
5. Id.
6. Book Review, 47 TULSA L. REv. 1 (2011); Book Review, 45 TULSA L. REv. 575 (2011).
7. Book Review, 48 TULSA L. REv. 169 (2012).
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its various forms, with consummate seriousness. Just as all of us join in honoring
Heather Gerken, we should equally join in honoring the Tulsa College of Law and the
Tulsa Law Review.
I mention this not only to indicate my links with, and fondness for, the Tulsa Col-
lege of Law- and I have not even mentioned that its Dean is my cousin! - but also to
put into context the particular form that my ensuing remarks will take. For I will be fo-
cusing on a book that Heather Gerken published in 2009, The Democracy Index: Why
Our Election System is Failing and How to Fix It. No doubt other contributors will fo-
cus on one or another of her excellent articles; I will be ignoring them in favor of her
book. In addition, I will also discuss another book only recently published by an Okla-
homan who for many years represented Oklahoma City and its environs (depending on
gerrymanders) in the U.S. House of Representatives. I refer to Mickey Edwards, who has
just published a book titled The Parties Versus the People: How to Turn Republicans
and Democrats into Americans.9 Gerken is known to be a Democrat; Edwards is a Re-
publican. Both agree, though, that all is not well in our political system. 10 As it happens,
I strongly agree with them, as evidenced in the titles of my two most recent books: Our
Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (and How We the Peo-
ple Can Correct It)11 and, more recently, Framed: America's Fifty-One Constitutions
and the Crisis of Governance.12 And I agree with much of their analyses. However -
and this will be the central thrust of my contribution to this symposium - there is a dis-
tinct difference in sensibility between both of their books and my own.
All of us are looking for ways to make the existing political system function better.
I think, however, it is fair to describe both Gerken and Edwards as meliorists, searching
for solutions that might well appeal to those currently exercising political power, includ-
ing, for that matter, voters who might, however critical they may be of aspects of Ameri-
can politics, be fearful of anything labeled as "radical" responses. 13 A central theme of
The Democracy Index is that we must always be concerned with, as Gerken puts it, "Get-
ting from Here to There in Election Reform." 1 4 And quite often the answer is indeed by
finding sympathetic allies within the existing political system who agree that some rela-
tively limited measure of reforms is necessary. One should, it is true, always recognize
that an idealized best is often the enemy of what might be an achievable good; another
way of putting this is that even half-filled glasses, though, by definition also half-empty,
are more sustaining than empty ones.
My own sensibility is, for lack of a better word, more radical. So part of me re-
joiced two years ago when I read the remarks of former Ohio Republican Senator George
8. HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM is FAILING AND How TO
FIX IT (2009).
9. MICKEY EDWARDS, THE PARTIES VERSUS THE PEOPLE: How TO TURN REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS
INTO AMERICANS (2012).
10. Id. at x; GERKEN, supra note 8, at 1.
11. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG
(AND HOW THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
12. SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA'S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF
GOVERNANCE (2012).
13. See EDWARDS, supra note 9, at xvii-xix; GERKEN, supra note 8, at 2-3.
14. GERKEN, supra note 8, at 6.
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Voinovich, who chose not to seek re-election in 2010 out of disgust with what he saw in
the Senate: "I think," he told Washington Post reporter Dana Milbank, "we have to blow
up the place." 15 I presume that Senator Voinovich was speaking metaphorically; I am
sure that neither of us in fact wants to blow up the Senate. That being said, I am also sure
that both of us, from decidedly different perspectives, believe that we must question
basic assumptions we make about the operation of our political institutions and perhaps
countenance the possibility of quite drastic changes that would leave the Senate, in im-
portant ways, fundamentally unrecognizable to those who know well the present institu-
tion.16 One's propensity to be a meliorist or a bomb-thrower may in part be dispositional,
going back to the way one was raised as a child or, if one is more fatalistic, the particular
genes we might have been dealt even earlier.
It may also be the case, though, that these differences might be explicable by look-
ing at the extent to which one believes that we really do face what James Madison re-
peatedly called "exigent" circumstances or "crises." 1 7 After all, as law students learn in
first-year constitutional law courses, "compelling interests" may sometimes require dras-
tic, even what would otherwise be near-unthinkable, solutions.18 But, as law students al-
so learn, there is often vigorous disagreement on the actual circumstances of a given sit-
uation. To take an obvious example, even if one thinks that "national security" is indeed
a fundamental interest, one might still be altogether skeptical that the detention of over
100,000 Japanese resident aliens and their American-citizen children was necessary in
1942 as part of a justified war effort against Japan. 19 That is, there is always an empirical
dimension in the recognition of a genuine "compelling interest," in addition to agreement
on the abstract importance of values such as national security. As Gerken's Yale col-
league Dan Kahan has often suggested, it may well be that personal or cultural predispo-
sitions more often explain how one frames even empirical evidence, so that it is fruitless
to believe that we will all agree even on basic facts of the matter, let alone the weight we
should assign given values.20 And, even should we reach agreement on both weight and
empirics, it remains far easier to imagine drastic change, especially if one is an academic,
than to suggest plausible ways to bring it about.
In any event, all of us should recognize, and celebrate, the fact that Heather Gerken
wears many hats. Most obviously, she is a superb analyst of American election law -
what some have taken to calling the "law of democracy"21 - as well as, more recently,
of how we might structure political institutions to assure that minorities within larger
populations have the opportunity to enjoy some measures of genuine decision-making
15. Dana Milbank, As Voinovich Leaves Senate, He Sees a Deficit of Good Sense, WASH. POST (Dec. 6,
2010, 8:00 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/06/AR2010120605913.html.
16. See id.
17. See, for example, THE FEDERALIST No. 40 (James Madison), as discussed in LEVINSON, supra note 12,
at 354-56.
18. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
19. See id.
20. Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 754-56
(2008).
21. See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDEs, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (4th ed. 2007).
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authority within smaller enclaves.22 "Dissenters" should receive the opportunity, at least
on occasion, to be genuine "deciders" with regard to at least some dimensions of their
public lives.23 This latter body of work is essential reading for anyone interested in "de-
centralization," "subsidiarity," or the legal controversies surrounding such central con-
cepts as "federalism" within the American polity. Indeed, one important implication of
her recent work is that we must think more seriously than we often do of the implications
of "home (or other sub-state) rule" within America's fifty states.24 If one takes seriously
some of the initial arguments for preserving federalism against the centralizing tenden-
cies of a national government, then one should grapple with the relevance of centralized
state power in such contemporary states as California or Texas, which are, respectively,
roughly nine and six times the entire population of the United States in 1790.25 These are
the subjects of other presentations as we honor her important body of work.
I want to focus on one aspect of that work that, however linked to these topics, is
nonetheless somewhat orthogonal to it inasmuch as she moves from the traditional
scholarly role of the (relatively) detached analyst to that of the unabashed
er.26 Although all of her work can be viewed as profound acts of citizenship, inasmuch
as her topic is the working of America's democratic (and not so democratic) institutions,
only some of it partakes of what can be described as "proactive" citizenship. But that is
precisely the attribute one finds in her book The Democracy Index.27 Although the title is
somewhat anodyne, that is certainly not true of the subtitle: Why Our Election System Is
Failing and How to Fix It.28 There is, to put it mildly, nothing detached about the subti-
tle or of the body of the often stirring text. The book, from its title to its last page, is a
call, if not to arms, then to action by her fellow Americans to help fix an election system
whose failures threaten to make a mockery of our claim to call ourselves a genuinely
"democratic" political order. 29
She begins her book by stating forthrightly that "[t]he best evidence we have sug-
gests that our election system is clunky at best and dysfunctional at worst." 30 Though she
rejects the metaphor of "Russian roulette" as excessive, she does say, altogether convinc-
ingly, that "we aren't prepared for the electoral equivalent of a Category 4 or 5 hurri-
cane," 3 1 which presumably is bad enough. "It's hard to tell where disaster will strike, but
it doesn't make sense to bet against disaster in the long haul."32 Quoting Rick Hasen, she
rejects reliance on "the election administrator's prayer: 'Lord, let this election not be
22. See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting By Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1745 (2005).
23. See id at 1750.
24. See GERKEN, supra note 8, at 5-6.
25. U.S. Population by State, 1790 to 2011, FACT MONSTER,
http://www.factmonster.com/ipka/A0004986.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) (showing the population of Texas
in 2011 to be 25,647,681 and California's as 37,691,912, while the population of the United States in 1790 was
3,929,214).
26. See GERKEN, supra note 8, at 5-6.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., id. at 27-36.
30. Id. at 1.
31. Id. at 12.
32. Id. at 12-13.
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close,"' 33 a prayer most spectacularly rejected in the presidential election of 2000 and the
senatorial election in Minnesota in 2008, where Minnesota went several months without
its second senator because of long delays necessitated by the recounting of ballots and, as
one would readily predict in the modem world, what threatened to be endless litigation
about decisions as to particular votes. 34
It is worth noting that we gathered in Tulsa approximately six weeks before the
2012 elections, and the race between President Obama and Governor Romney, not to
mention a host of Senate and House races, was still well within the famous "margin of
error" used by poll-takers.35 Later readers will have the benefit of knowing whether the
"prayer" was answered in all of these races or whether there are indeed acrimonious
challenges to the legitimacy of the selection process in particular states. Certainly the late
summer and early fall featured a number of law suits, most prominently in Pennsylvania,
Ohio, Florida, and Texas, challenging a variety of recent changes in election laws that, it
has been alleged, were backed by Republicans precisely for the purpose of diminishing
the Democratic vote.36 Some of these suits have been successful, some of them not. 37
The ones in Ohio and Florida are especially significant for the presidential race inasmuch
as both of these states are, thanks to the Electoral College mechanism, "battleground"
states, which means that the stakes attached to turnout are especially high.38 But control
of the Senate might also ultimately turn on possibly disputed results in one or two
states. 39 (As it happens, that turned out not to be the case, though several elections for
the House of Representatives remained undecided until well after Election Day.)
These lawsuits highlight, incidentally, the fact that all elections in the United States
are local, not simply in the sense once evoked by the late Speaker of the House Tip
O'Neill's proclamation that "all politics [are] local,"40 but, rather in the far more legalis-
tic sense that elections are conducted by states, not by the United States. Jeff Rosen once
33. Id. at 13 (quoting Richard Hasen, Voting System is Haunted by Democratic Meltdown, ELECTION L.
BLOG (Jan. 21, 2008, 3:20 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=9174).
34. For more on these stories, see Dan Balz, Up By 930, Bush Side Assails Recount, WASH. POsT, Nov. 19,
2000, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/elections/electionl9.htm and
Manu Raju & Josh Kraushaar, Norm Coleman Concedes Minnesota Senate Race to Al Franken, POLITICO (July
1, 2009, 11:02 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0609/24383.html.
35. Tom Foreman, Margin of Error: Two Candidates, Two Journeys, One Race of Lost Dreams, CNN POL.
(Nov. 5, 2012 10:29 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/04/politics/margin-of-error-campaign-foreman.
36. Ethan Bronner, A Tight Election May Be Tangled in Legal Battles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2012, at Al,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/1 0/us/politics/legal-battles-on-voting-may-prove-a-critical-
issue-in-election.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0 (discussing the legal battles in each of these states and the effects
on the presidential election).
37. Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming the district court's
decision that held the state's new election laws violated equal protection); Texas v. Holder, No. 12 Civ. 128
(D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2012) (striking down the state's new election laws); League of Women Voters of Fla. v.
Browning, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (N.D. Fla. 2012) (striking down the state's new voting requirements); Apple-
white v. Commonwealth, No. 330, 2012 WL 5374328 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (denying plaintiffs' motion for
an injunction against the state's new election laws). See also Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir.
2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96) (challenging Section Five of the Vot-
ing Rights Act).
38. Bronner, supra note 36.
39. David Catanese, Top Senate Races Tighten Up, POLITICO (July 2, 2012, 6:08 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/78078.html (discussing the races that could determine control of
the Senate).
40. Biography: Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/biography/carter-oneill/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
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pronounced this aspect of the Constitution to be its most "stupid" feature. 4 1 My only dis-
agreement with Rosen concerns its place in the list of such "constitutional stupidities"
inasmuch as others may be even worse. To be sure, as illustrated by the lawsuits, states
may be constrained by the U.S. Constitution42 or by relevant statutes passed by Con-
gress. 43 States, however, retain perhaps all too much discretion concerning such issues as
eligibility to vote in the first place -just think of the millions of disenfranchised former
felons; the period of time during which one can cast a vote, including both "early voting"
prior to election day and then the length of time that polls will be open on election day
itself; or, a specially contentious subject in 2012, the requirement that would-be voters
have the requisite identification to prove to a suspicious (and partisan) poll watcher that
they are in fact legally qualified to vote.44
The thrust of Gerken's short and immensely readable book is to suggest that we
should begin building levees against possible electoral hurricanes by establishing what
she calls a "democracy index." 4 5 This refers principally to gathering a wealth of infor-
mation, much of which is lacking in our remarkably (and unfortunately) decentralized
system of elections, about such variables as how easy (or hard) it is, as a practical matter,
first to register to vote, then to cast a vote after registration, and, finally, to ascertain
whether every vote cast is in fact counted accurately.46 With regard to the second, for
example, important "proxies" for ease or difficulty can include how long it takes to wait
in line for an average voter to get to the ballot box. 47 This is no small matter, especially
in the United States; unlike many countries around the world, which have elections on
the weekend, the United States persists, because of an 1845 law passed by Congress, in
conducting its elections for national office on a single Tuesday in November.48 Not only
is there a greater risk, in at least some states, of bad weather that might diminish turnout;
there is also the obvious fact that anyone who works for hourly wages or runs a small
business of his or her own must balance the time involved in voting against the potential
loss of wages or business. Voting early in the morning or after work is obviously easier if
one does not have small children or is otherwise weighed down by family responsibili-
ties.
Gerken suggests that amassing the relevant data would allow us to compile an "in-
dex" by which states could be compared with one another along the relevant dimen-
sions. 49 One can think of such analogues as the annual Freedom House reports on the
state of democracy across the world,50 or a somewhat similar set of annual evaluations
41. See Jeffrey Rosen, Divided Suffrage, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES
81 (William Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
42. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
43. See, e.g., The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub.L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2012)), amended by Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (1975); Pub. L. No.
97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982).
44. Deborah Charles, Voter ID Laws Spark Heated Debate Before Election, REUTERS (Apr. 5, 2012, 6:35
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/us-usa-campaign-voterid-idUSBRE83400W20120405.
45. GERKEN, supra note 8, at 12-13, 26-37.
46. Id. at 131-32.
47. Id. at 131.
48. 2 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
49. GERKEN, supra note 8, at 26-30.
50. See Reports, FREEDOM HOUSE, http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
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by The Economist.5 1 The latter, for example, ranked Norway as the most democratic
country in the world in 2011;52 the United States comes in at nineteenth, 53 a drop of two
from the previous year. 54 Ahead of the United States were not only all of the Scandina-
vian countries and such British commonwealth countries as Australia, New Zealand, and
Canada (as well as Great Britain), but also Ireland, Germany, Austria, the Czech Repub-
lic, and Uruguay. 55 Only 1/100th of a point separated the United States from Costa Rica
at number twenty.56 Presumably, we are - or certainly should be - embarrassed to be
so low, especially given the public stance of the United States as the very instantiation of
democracy. One might believe, albeit contrary to fact, that we would be collectively mo-
tivated to try to increase our ranking by changing at least some of the ways we do things.
Those who shout "USA, USA" should, one assumes, want the United States to rank
"number one" in these indices as well as in soccer or gymnastics. Instead, one might well
expect the 2012 elections to manifest even more problems than its twenty-first century
counterparts, whether because of the financially straitened circumstances of many states
and localities actually charged with conducting elections or, as already suggested, highly
partisan changes in election law that skeptics explain far more as efforts to discourage
turnout of potential oppositionist voters than as good-faith attempts to cure genuine prob-
lems with the American electoral system.57
There is, it should immediately be acknowledged, an obvious problem with com-
paring indices on proficiency in soccer, gymnastics, golf, or tennis, with proficiency in
democracy. As Gerken fully recognizes, evaluations of the latter will inevitably involve
what political theorists call "essentially contested," often bitterly disputed, concepts that
have deep emotional and ideological valence within the wider culture.58 What, after all,
does constitute "democracy"? We have been debating this question for at least twenty-
five hundred years, and the debate has only grown sharper since the time, as recently as
the nineteenth century, that "democracy" turned from a term of relative opprobrium to a
purportedly desirable attribute of a polity. Or, to take a very different example linked
with my last visit to Tulsa, which honored former Israeli Justice Aharon Barak, how pre-
cisely do we define "torture"? 59 Here too, the question generates a panoply of intellectu-
al challenges, not least because our culture regards a regime as distinctly bad if it can be
described as engaging in "torture." So anyone interested in compiling a "democracy in-
dex" must be highly sensitive to the possibilities for rancor by those who believe that it
has been skewed to favor one political side. What, for example, would a full-fleshed
"democracy index" say about the role of money in politics and whether the Supreme
51. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, DEMOCRACY INDEX 2011: DEMOCRACY UNDER STRESS 3-8
(2011), available at http://www.sida.se/Global/About%20Sida/SC3%A5%20arbetar/20vi/EIUDemocracy
Index Dec2011.pdf.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. at 4.
54. Id. at 11.
55. Id. at 3-4.
56. Id. at 4.
57. See Balz, supra note 34; Bronner, supra note 36.
58. GERKEN, supra note 8, at 78-79.
59. Sanford Levinson, To What Extent is Judicial Intervention Against Torture a "Hollow Hope"?: Reflec-
tions on the Israeli and American Judicial Experiences Since 2001, 47 TULSA L. REv. 363, 366-72 (2011).
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Court's decision in Citizens United60 is itself enough to significantly lower the ranking
of the United States among the nations of the world? And the crux of my own recent
work is to argue that the U.S. Constitution itself disables us from counting as a robust
illustration of twenty-first century conceptions of democracy.61 Perhaps wisely, Gerken
avoids such questions.
Instead, she convincingly argues that even a relatively modest "index" could prove
immensely valuable, not least, she suggests, because states might be embarrassed to be
exposed as fundamentally deficient in comparison to other states.62 Such exposure
might, for example, give local officials, who are often burdened by state officials with
the actual tasks of conducting (and paying for) elections, additional clout with state legis-
latures who have proved stingy in providing the money needed to alleviate problems that
have already occurred and are easily foreseeable in the future.63 Who, for example,
should pay for "new and improved voting machines," or, just as importantly, who should
be charged for testing those machines to make sure that they have not been rigged in
ways that would deprive some voters from actually having their votes counted?
Failure to reform, in turn, might provoke local political movements. Or perhaps
some states might become rightfully embarrassed at the patent conflicts of interest pre-
sent in allowing the chief election official, often the secretary of state, to be a highly par-
tisan (and often elected) official. Thus, notoriously, the infamous Katherine Harris, in
charge of Florida's debacle following the 2000 vote, was also the co-chair of the Bush-
Cheney campaign in that state, just as Ohio's secretaries of state in recent years have also
been active Republicans who often have further political ambitions of their own that may
depend on being good "party men and women" when overseeing the election process. 64
Thus, Gerken quotes the "straight-shooting" South Dakota Secretary of State: "[b]eing
nonpartisan doesn't earn a lot of points with the party faithful." 65 One does not have to
embrace the full Madisonian critique of "factions"66 in order to believe that partisan de-
cisionmaking during the process of elections themselves undercuts their basic legitimacy.
If one is disturbed, as former Justice O'Connor is, at the phenomenon of state judges
chosen in highly partisan (and increasingly expensive) elections,67 then one might ask
why we should be any more accepting of putting elections in the hands of officials se-
lected in overtly partisan elections.
I am fully on board with Gerken's critiques and proposals. I admire the book great-
ly and certainly hope it has the impact it deserves. This is true as well of Mickey Ed-
wards's sharply written and perhaps even more anguished book. Edwards might be de-
scribed as more Madisonian than Gerken is, for his book is full of denunciations of what
60. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
61. LEVINSON, supra note 12, at 5.
62. GERKEN, supra note 8, at 76-78.
63. See id at 77.
64. See Kevin Bohn, Ohio Secretary of State Defends Election Decisions, CNN POL. (Nov. 5 2012, 9:48
PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/05/ohio-secretary-of-state-defends-election-decisions/; Edi-
torial, The Return of Katherine Harris, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/16/opinion/16thu2.html?_r-0.
65. GERKEN, supra note 8, at 16 (citation omitted).
66. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
67. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788-92 (2002) (O'Conner, J., concurring).
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he recurrently describes as "the private power-seeking clubs known as 'parties."'68 He
obviously strikes a distinctly Madisonian chord when he declares that "' [p]arty' has be-
come a synonym for rigid, uncompromising, narrow 'faction.' And we are paying a very
steep price for it." 69 He declares that "the party-driven politics of the past century must
disappear . . . if Americans are to regain a sense of common identity and work together
to solve the problems of the twenty-first century."7 0 Although he became part of the
House Republican leadership before leaving the House, he is clearly disillusioned with
the present state of political polarization and the degree to which elected officials think
only of the interests of their own parties and not in terms of, as Madison would have put
it, the "public good" of America at large.7 1 As I have written in my own book, Republi-
can Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, having stated that his overriding com-
mitment was depriving President Obama of a second term,72 behaved entirely rationally
in attempting as well to deprive the President of anything that could be conveyed to the
electorate as an accomplishment. 73 If one believes, as I do, that George W. Bush's elec-
tion in 2004 was considerably aided by the decision of the late Senator Ted Kennedy to
work with Bush on - and therefore allow him to take credit for - what became the two
signature domestic achievements of Bush's first term, the No Child Left Behind Act re-
garding education and the coverage of prescription drugs by Medicare, then it cannot
surprise anyone that McConnell was determined not to emulate Kennedy's role as the de-
facto enabler of an opposition President.74 What McConnell might say, of course, is that
it is in the public interest to return the White House to Republicans, and that short-term
costs attached to non-cooperation (such as the lowering of America's credit rating fol-
lowing the debt-limit fiasco) is a small price to pay for the good attached to evicting
Obama and replacing him with any Republican at all, in this instance Mitt Romney. 75
What Edwards writes is that we must "reclaim our democracy, not from an invading ar-
my but from the parasitic destruction waged in the name of partisan interest."76 Strong
words indeed!
Like Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann, whose recent book is even more telling-
ly titled It's Even Worse than It Looks,77 Edwards is disgusted by what he observes in
Congress. One suspects that all three of these authors - I am most confident of Thom-
as Mann, who contributed an enthusiastic blurb endorsing Gerken's "compelling" book79
- would also agree with Gerken that we are ill-served by the present way we conduct
68. EDWARDS, supra note 9, at 86.
69. Id at 6.
70. Id. at 31.
71. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
72. See, e.g., David Edwards, McConnell: Stopping Obama's Re-election Still Single Most Important'
Goal, RAW STORY (July 10, 2011, 11:30 AM), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/07/10/mcconnell-stopping-
obamas-re-election-still-single-most-important-goal/.
73. LEVINSON, supra note 12, at 234.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. EDWARDS, supra note 9, at 177.
77. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: How THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM, at xii-xiv (2012).
78. EDWARDS, supra note 9, at 8-9.
79. GERKEN, supra note 8 (including Thomas E. Mann's review on the back cover).
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our elections.80 It can occasion no surprise then, that many pundits, across the political
spectrum, describe the American system of government, particularly at the national level,
as "dysfunctional," or even as does Tom Friedman of the New York Times, as "patholog-
ical." 8 1
Consider, after all, the fact that decidedly less than 20 percent of the American
public approves of Congress.82 A summation of polls taken through mid-September
2012 found that only 13.8 percent of the public "approved" of Congress, while 79.6 per-
cent "disapproved," which is a gap of nearly 66 percent.8 3 As I have suggested else-
where, I suspect that more people living in the American colonies approved of the British
Parliament in 1776, given the number of Loyalists who refused to join the "patriots' in-
surrection. 84 It is hard to argue that the "state of the Union" is good, given the remarka-
ble number of Americans, of all political persuasions, who can be described as having
utter contempt for our basic institutions and many of our national leaders. Even the Su-
preme Court, for the first time, has fallen below 50 percent with regard to its level of
public esteem. 85 A June 2012 Gallup Poll, for example, found that only 44 percent of
those polled "approved" of the Court,86 though a more recent Gallup Poll in early Sep-
tember found that "approval" had climbed five points to 49 percent, while 40 percent in-
dicated their "disapproval." Interestingly enough, Democrats were more inclined to
approve, either as a tribute to the long-departed Warren Court or, more likely, in grati-
tude for the Court's not having overruled Roe v. Wade and moving toward various
recognitions of gay and lesbian rights. The only national-level institution that enjoys the
widespread confidence of the American public is the military, which may or may not be
reassuring to those who believe in what the Constitution calls a Republican Form of
Government.89
So there is definitely a spirit of discontent - and a call for at least some reforms
- in the air, at least if we look only at diagnosticians of the contemporary American pol-
ity, ranging from full-scale academics like Heather Gerken to disillusioned former politi-
cians like Mickey Edwards; from respected think-tank commentators like Mann and
Ornstein to professional pundits like David Brooks and Tom Friedman, to name only two
distinguished pundits who write for The New York Times. Friedman, for example, has
80. EDWARDS, supra note 9, at 36; MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 77, at 132-33.
81. LEVINSON, supra note 12, at 8-9; World to U.S.: Will You Control Guns Now?, NEWS LATITUDE (Dec.
16, 2012), http://www.latitudenews.com/story/world-to-us-will-you-control-guns-now/.
82. Congressional Job Approval Poll, REAL CLEAR POL.,
http://www.realclearpolitics.comlepolls/other/congressionaljobapproval-903.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
8 3. Id.
84. See, e.g., MAYA JASANOFF, LIBERTY'S EXILES: AMERICAN LOYALISTS IN A REVOLUTIONARY WORLD
8-14 (2011).
85. Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approvalfor Justices Hits Just 44% in New Poll, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
2012, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/us/politics/44-percent-of-americans-approve-of-
supreme-court-in-new-poll.html?pagewanted=all.
86. Id.
87. Supreme Court, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx (last visited Mar. 2,
2013).
88. Jeffrey M. Jones, Party Divide Still Evident in Supreme Court Job Approval: Fifty-Seven Percent of
Democrats, 36% of Republicans Approve, GALLUP (Sept. 28, 2012),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx.
89. See LEVINSON, supra note 12, at 76-83.
486 Vol. 48:477
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 48 [2012], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol48/iss3/5
MELIORISM V. "BOMB-THROWING"
repeatedly written of "the failure of our political system to unite, even in a crisis, to pro-
duce the policy responses America needs to thrive in the 21st century,"90 and even sug-
gested in a later column that the United States might need its own version of an "Arab
spring." 9 1 Indeed, in a 2011 book, Friedman and his co-author Michael Mandelbaum
write of the "pathologies of [our] political system."92 Friedman concluded his "Arab
spring" column as follows: "We can't be great as long as we remain a vetocracy" - by
which he means "a system in which no one can aggregate enough power to make any
important decisions at all," because there are simply too many vetopoints along the way
- "rather than a democracy. Our deformed political system - with a Congress that's
become a forum for legalized bribery - is now truly holding us back." 93
The patient is sick. Something must be done - and quickly - at least according
to Friedman and, it seems, Edwards.94 Gerken, perhaps because she wrote her book a
few years earlier, adopts a less urgent tone even if, as already indicated, she is warning
us about the possibility of hurricanes ravaging our already-vulnerable election system
and thus calling the basic legitimacy of our political system into ever increasing ques-
tion.95 So one question that must be directed at any analyst of our political system, even
if willing to emulate Richard III (not perhaps the happiest of sources) by speaking of "the
winter [and spring, summer, and fall] of our discontent,"96 is the extent of the discontent
and the seriousness of the diagnosis. To stick with the medical analogy, has the political
biopsy found the equivalent of a stage one cancer that can be alleviated, perhaps even
completely cured, by what is in context an easily endurable treatment protocol? Or are
we confronted with a worst stage diagnosis, where the only hope, if indeed there is any
hope at all, is found in radical, basically untested, experimental procedures?
One must always ask Lenin's question - "what is to be done?" 97 - even if one,
for very good reason, rejects his specific answer. But what is to be done? How do we get
from here - a condition of significant, but perhaps not truly measured (even if, a sepa-
rate question, measurable), systemic sickness - to there, what some would regard as a
restoration of what we would like to think is best about the American political system,
and what others, like, perhaps, the proponents of the aptly named "Reconstruction
amendments," might believe is necessary to change a system that is defective at its
core?9 8 Here, I confess, is where I may depart from my good friends Heather Gerken and
Mickey Edwards, however much I both agree with their diagnoses and respect them as
astute and patriotic diagnosticians. For better or (possibly) for worse, neither can be de-
scribed as a "bomb-thrower" (in the metaphorical, Voinovichian sense), and this neces-
90. Thomas L. Friedman, An X-Ray ofDysfunction, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2010, at WK8.
91. Thomas L. Friedman, Down With Everything, N.Y. TIMES, April 22, 2012 at SRI 1.
92. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN & MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THAT USED TO BE Us: How AMERICA FELL
BEHIND IN THE WORLD IT INVENTED AND How WE CAN COME BACK 243 (2011).
93. Friedman, supra note 91.
94. See EDWARDS, supra note 9; Friedman, supra note 91.
95. GERKEN, supra note 8, at 12-13.
96. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD III, act 1, sc. 1.
97. VLADIMIR IL'iCH LENIN, WHAT IS TO BE DONE?: BURNING QUESTIONS OF OUR MOVEMENT (N.Y. Int'l
Pub. 1969) (1902).
98. See ALFRED AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN CONGRESS ON THE 13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH AMENDMENTS (1974).
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sarily means, as is true, incidentally, also of Ornstein and Mann, whom I also admire,
that their diagnosis, for all of its acuity, is not followed by the perhaps scary advice that
drastic measures may be necessary.
Gerken is admirably forthright in this regard. She explicitly notes that she is
"pragmatic in [her] approach."99 One of the things this means, and I agree wholehearted-
ly, is that we must rely less on abstract, often empirically unverified "ideals," and more
on what we can learn from the data we need to collect on the actualities of our election
system.10 0 But another meaning is that we need to figure out imaginative ways to create
incentives that will lead existing political officials to change their behavior. Thus one
premise of a Democracy Index is that it will generate a virtuous competition by which
states - and localities within states - will compete in a "race to the top" once they are
exposed as seriously deficient in one or other measure of what we mean by a democratic
election system. 10 1 Like Cass Sunstein, who also offers an enthusiastic endorsement of
her book,102 she wants ultimately to rely on markets and "nudges" rather than radical re-
design of basic institutions and/or centralized law-making that would invariably bring in
its wake the need for strong command-and-control systems,103 including, one presumes,
active judicial enforcement of the kind seen over the past near-half-century with regard
to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.104 As Gerken puts it, "[r]ather than focus on proposals
that require the foxes to stop guarding the henhouse or imagining that our centuries-old
tradition of localism will vanish overnight, we should think more about how to domesti-
cate the foxes and harness the power of local competition."105 She recognizes that "this
type of here-to-there strategy may not seem as grand as an overhaul of the system," but
"it offers a more realistic hope of effecting change in the long run."l06 For Gerken, what
may well be fantasies of an unattainable best are definitely the enemies of what may be
attainable improvements. 107
Perhaps because Edwards focuses on Congress rather than the election system,
many of his proposals would require, if not "overhaul," at the least changes in the ordi-
nary way we do things. os Most dramatic for many readers will be his suggestion that the
House select its speaker from outside its confines. 109 The Constitution does not require
that the Speaker be an elected member of the House;1 10 it would be a truly important po-
litical change, but not one requiring a constitutional amendment, if both parties were
forced, through, say, a two-thirds election rule, to select a person of proven stature who
could be counted on to administer the House on a public-regarding, rather than party-
99. GERKEN, supra note 8, at 135.
100. Id
101. Id. at 24.
102. See id. (including Cass R. Sunstein's review on the back cover).
103. Id. at 135.
104. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1(2012)).
105. GERKEN, supra note 8, at 36.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. See EDWARDS, supra note 9, at xiii.
109. Id. at 103-04.
110. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives shall chuse [sic] their Speaker. . .
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regarding basis. No longer, for example, would a Speaker feel free to follow the prac-
tice of former Speaker Dennis Hastert, who, according to Edwards, "thought his job was
to serve as de facto floor leader for the Republican president, thereby diminishing the
role of the House of Representatives as an independent and coequal part of American
government."ll2 During his tenure, Hastert initiated the unprecedented policy of bring-
ing to the House floor for votes only measures that had received the support of a majority
of the House Republican caucus.1 13 Described as the "majority of the majority" require-
ment, this meant, by definition, that bills that might have the support of a majority of the
House, in a coalition that included a minority of Republicans with a majority of the
Democrats, would never stand a chance of passage.114 Newt Gingrich is often cited as
the source of the hyper partisanship afflicting the present House of Representatives, but
not even Gingrich formally adopted such a basically anti-democratic and partisan con-
ception of his official duties. 115
Adopting Edwards's suggestion would have the added benefit of increasing sub-
stantially the likelihood that a Speaker, if asked suddenly to take leadership of the Execu-
tive Branch because of the deaths or incapacities (or impeachments) of a President and
Vice President, would actually be someone one might trust to be Commander in Chief of
the armed forces and otherwise to make the kinds of decisions that, for better or worse,
we ask our contemporary President to make. No one can seriously argue that any recent
Speakers have been "presidential material." The only recent former Speaker to seek the
Oval Office was Newt Gingrich in 2012, who was dismissed even by most of his own
party as the equivalent of a clown, though without a typical clown's benignity.116 The
last Speaker to be taken seriously as a presidential candidate was John Nance Garner in
1932; because of the two-thirds rule under which the Democratic Party then operated at
its national conventions, he forced multiple votes by the delegates before throwing in the
towel to Franklin Roosevelt. 117 He later accepted Roosevelt's invitation, sincere or oth-
erwise, for the Vice Presidency - an office he later memorably described as "not worth
a bucket of warm piss."lls
Edwards offers other thoughtful suggestions as well, including limiting the ability
of House and Senate majorities to dominate the committee process and, importantly, to
deny to minority legislators the ability to use subpoenas to compel testimony of those
they suspect of chicanery or who might otherwise throw valuable light on the administra-
tion of our multi-million member (and multi-trillion dollar) federal bureaucracy. 1 19 The
only time a modem Congress actually engages in genuine oversight of the Executive
111. EDWARDS, supra note 9, at 103-04.
112. Id. at 91-92.
113. Charles Babington, Hastert Launches a Partisan Policy, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2004, at AO1.
114. Id.
115. See EDWARDS, supra note 9, at 93.
116. John Helton & Alyssa McLendon, Gingrich's 2012 Campaign Leaves Him With Mixed Legacy, CNN
POL. (May 2, 2012 5:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/25/politics/gingrich-campaign-obit.
117. See Lionel V. Patenaude, Garner, John Nance, TEX. ST. HIST. Ass'N,
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fga24 (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
118. Patrick Cox, John Nance Garner on the Vice Presidency -In Search of the Proverbial Bucket,
BRISCOE CENTER FOR AM. HISTORY, http://www.cah.utexas.edu/news/press release.php?press=press bucket
(last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
119. EDWARDS, supra note 9, at 104-11, 136-37.
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Branch is when we have "divided government," which means not what Madison meant
- the formal division of national government into separate divisions or institutionsl 20
- but, rather, the capture of one or another of these institutions by a political party dif-
ferent from the one occupying the White House.121 Of course, the oversight is of a dis-
tinctly partisan character, designed to develop points that might be useful in the next
election. And, for reasons already suggested, it is extremely unlikely in the modem era
that divided government will lead to productive legislation, lest, as with Kennedy and
Bush, the "opposition party" in fact enables the re-election of a President by collaborat-
ing in statutes that can be labeled as genuine accomplishments and testimony to the abil-
ity of the President in question to "work well with others," as it were. 122
But does Edwards, for all his justified anger and genuinely stimulating suggestions
for reform, truly want to "blow the House up"? The answer, for better or worse, is no.
Although he offers an altogether merited critique of partisan gerrymandering,123 by
which political officeholders are in effect allowed to choose their voters rather than the
other way around, he does not confront the possibility that the United States might well
emulate most of the rest of the world and stop relying exclusively on single-member, ge-
ographically-based, districts. The Constitution does not require this; a congressional law
dating to 1842 is the culprit. 124 "My goal," Edwards writes, "is not to determine 'who'
voters vote for, but to give them a greater range of choices: in other words, to expand
democracy."l25 Well, one way of doing this is to adopt systems of proportional represen-
tation, which would allow minorities who now correctly feel frozen out of the political
process, even in a voting system that might score very high in Gerken's "democracy in-
dex"1 26 - i.e., they are allowed to vote and their votes are counted; they simply will
never actually be able to elect anyone they prefer - to discover after election day that
they have in fact voted for a winner. There were good reasons for Congress's 1842 deci-
sion to prohibit state-wide winner-take-all ballots where, for example, a 51 percent ma-
jority could elect all ten representatives in a given state. 127 But correcting for that prob-
lem does not entail adopting, and then sticking resolutely with, our present scheme for
electing representatives.
Even more volatile is the possibility we might learn from many states and adopt
certain procedures of direct democracy to complement the exclusive reliance on repre-
sentative democracy chosen by the Constitution's framers, almost all of whom were pro-
120. THE FEDERALIST No. 40 (James Madison).
121. See EDWARDS, supra note 9, at 3-4.
122. This is, it should be acknowledged, a debatable assertion. Yale political scientist David Mayhew, for
example, insists that divided government is no worse for the nation, measured by the passage of significant
legislation, than is unitary government (and it brings with it as well the greater likelihood of genuine oversight).
See DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-
2002 (2d ed. 2005). Edwards, Mann, and Ornstein would obviously disagree. I offer my own critique of May-
hew in LEVINSON, supra note 12, at 235-36.
123. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 9, at 67.
124. Earl M. Maltz, Power in Numbers: Reapportionment and the Constitution 4 NAT'L CONST. CTR. 3, 6-7
(2011) (discussing the Apportionment Act of 1842).
125. EDWARDS, supra note 9, at 14.
126. See GERKEN, supra note 8, at 26-36.
127. See Maltz, supra note 124, at 6-7.
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foundly suspicious of the actual capacity of people to rule themselves.128 I confess that I
thought that Edwards was signaling his possible support for such reforms when he ended
his book by calling for citizens in states that allow popular initiative and referenda to
take the lead in forcing electoral system changes when entrenched partisan representa-
tives were unwilling to do so.129 Why stop at changing the election system? Why not
address the possibility that there should be a more general power, at the national as well
as at the state level, for disgruntled electorates to do end-runs around their ostensible
''representatives" by taking the initiative and then passing legislation in general? A more
moderate version of this initiative is to adopt as a national policy the kind of "citizen re-
view" - an analogue to "judicial review" - whereby the electorate, as recently oc-
curred in both Maine and Ohio, in effect "overrule" legislation passed by the respective
state legislature and signed by the governor.1 30 Alas, Edwards may in fact limit his inter-
est in direct democracy only to reforms of the process itself
Or perhaps our problem is that we assume that "representative democracy" re-
quires elected officials at all. A number of recent political theorists have rediscovered the
ancient Greek reliance on selection of officials by lottery. Why not choose at least some,
if not all, members of the House of Representatives the way jurors are chosen? We trust
jurors in many states literally with the power to decide whether criminal defendants will
live or die. To the extent that many basic issues addressed in the House of Representa-
tives involve basic value choices rather than the technical means of implementation that
we increasingly delegate to administrative agencies to create, there is no particular rea-
son to believe that men and women chosen under the current system as delineated by
Gerken and Edwards will do a better job than a random sample given the opportunity to
study and hold their own hearings on important issues of the day.
One might well believe that these latter proposals, unlike Edwards's or, even more
so, Gerken's, are, even if intellectually defensible, quixotic or "flakey." That is surely a
winning argument if the considerably tamer proposals offered even by such patriotic and
worried citizens as Gerken and Edwards (or by Mann and Ornstein) would suffice to put
us back on the right track. One certainly hopes that is the case precisely because, among
other things, the Constitution's most truly egregious feature, Article V, makes it impos-
sible, as a practical matter, to amend the Constitution should we conclude that only some
fairly radical treatment will suffice to cure our political disease. 131
None of my concerns about the limits of a meliorist approach to political reform
should be taken to detract from my genuine admiration for the concerned citizenship and
truly imaginative suggestions that are to be found in Gerken's and Edwards's books.
Gerken especially represents the kind of civic engagement that should be celebrated
within the legal academy. For much too long, such engagement was basically limited to
128. See LEVINSON, supra note 12, at 78.
129. Id at 179-81, 183-86.
130. See Maria Sacchetti, Maine Voters Overturn State's New Same-Sex Marriage Law, BOSTON.COM (Nov.
4, 2009), http://www.boston.com/news/local/maine/articles/2009/11/04/maine voters overturn states new sa
me sex marriagelaw/; Ohio Issue 2: Controversial Anti-Union Law Defeated by Voters, HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/08/ohio-issue-2-_n 1083100.html (last updated Nov. 9, 2011, 12:38
PM).
131. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
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the writing of quasi-briefs directed at litigants and judges, in the mistaken belief that
judges were the only decision makers that law professors should be truly concerned with.
Thus, articles on the "law of democracy" became ever more arcane examinations of the
Ptolemaic epicycles of legal doctrines as enunciated in often opaque 5-4 decisions. The
principal message of many of these decisions was that, as a matter of fact, seven or even
eight of the Justices might well agree that the current doctrine was indefensible, but, for
better or worse, they split 4-3 or 4-4 on what the defensible doctrine should be. This
meant, of course, that the fabled "median Justice," whose particular views were solidly
rejected by the rest of the Court, would, nonetheless, supply the all-important fifth vote
(and, even worse, write the majority opinion) that attempted to make sense of a series of
decisions that everyone else agreed were, at a deep level, senseless. Heather Gerken is
not writing for judges and their law clerks. Instead, she is doing something far more im-
portant. She is addressing her fellow citizens, in language devoid of the professional
mumbo-jumbo we are too often prone to use, about a truly serious problem that threatens
our political order. They should read her, and they should listen to her.
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